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ABSTRACT: Conventional public construction procurement practices in Japan have been often considered 
to have unique and problematic characteristics as compared with those in foreign countries. Looking at 
business transactions in other field than public works, however, there exists a sector with similar 
characteristics. The objectives of this paper are, thus, to demonstrate that conventional public construction 
procurement practices in Japan and the arrangement employed by De Beers to market gem-quality rough 
diamonds have very similar characteristics and the conventional Japanese practices have an economic 
viability when there is sufficient budget and massive construction is required. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Conventional public construction procurement 
practices in Japan have been often considered to 
have unique and problematic characteristics as 
compared with those in foreign countries. Looking at 
business transactions in other field than public works, 
however, there exists a sector with similar 
characteristics. A business transaction with similar 
characteristics is the arrangement employed by De 
Beers to market gem-quality rough diamonds. 
 Kenney and Klein discussed viability of this 
marketing arrangement. The objectives of this paper 
are, thus, to demonstrate that conventional public 
construction procurement practices in Japan and the 
marketing arrangement by De Beers have very 
similar characteristics and that the conventional 
Japanese practices have an economic viability when 
there is sufficient budget and massive construction is 
required.   
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKETING 
ARRANGEMENTS BY THE DE BEERS 
GROUP 
 
The Central Selling Organization (CSO) of the De 
Beers Group markets the largest number of 
gem-quality uncut diamond in the world. Main 
characteristics of the marketing arrangement 
employed by the De Beers are as follows: 
i) the CSO categorizes each rough diamond by 
shape, quality, color, and weight; 
ii) only invited buyers are eligible to purchase 
stones; and 
iii) the CSO assembles a single box (or “sight”) of 
diamonds for each buyer which he/she wishes to 
purchase. There is no negotiation over the price 
or composition of the site. Buyers who reject the 
diamonds offered them are deleted from the list 
of invited customers. 
 
The values of stones within each category are not 
the same, and actually their variance is substantial. 
The sales price can be said to be the average price in 
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each category.   
Some stones may be undervalued, and other 
stones may be overvalued. If buyers are allowed to 
search for undervalued stones and only purchase 
them, overpriced stones are remained.   
To avoid rejection of overpriced stones by buyers, 
the seller also needs to increase categorization efforts 
and price each stone more accurately. 
Since seller’s and buyers’ valuing criteria are 
similar; however, their evaluation efforts are 
duplicative and end up with creating social costs. 
Kenney and Klein label the attempt by buyers to 
obtain an informational advantage over the seller 
“oversearching.” The arrangement by the De Beers 
has advantage to avoid the oversearching and to save 
costs of evaluating values of stones.    
A part of saved evaluation costs is used as the 
premium, which is “added” to the sales price. 
“Addition” of the premium plays an important role 
in discouraging buyers to reject their assigned sights 
and completing sell and buy transactions smoothly. 
Kenney and Klein mention that the CSO of the De 
Beers group possesses two “brand names.” The first 
one is that “the expected discounted value of the net 
marketing cost efficiencies associated with their 
selling arrangement, which assures buyers that they 
will not cheat.” The second one is that the CSO “will 
share these marketing cost savings with buyers in the 
future, which prevents buyers from “cheating” 
them.” 
 
3. COMPARATISON BETWEEN THE TWO 
APPROACHES 
 
If we recognize the Japanese public clients and De 
Beers group as the client and contractors and buyers 
as trading partners of the clients, conventional public 
construction procurement practices in Japan and the 
arrangements by De Beers group have very similar 
characteristics. 
Their similarities are characterized in Table 1 with 
respect to characteristics of the client, a method of 
estimating transaction price, change of transaction 
price, discontinuation of transaction, level of 
transaction price, and process of determining 
transaction partners. 
The first similarity is that the both clients have 
been monopolistically conducting a great amount of 
transactions. In 1977 fiscal year when the number of 
ordered public works was the highest in Japan, more 
than 550,000 public works were ordered. One of the 
highest concerns for the both clients is smooth 
completion of transactions. 
The second similarity is that the both clients 
efficiently estimate mean values or statistical 
average of stones or construction service of which 
they would like to conduct transaction and set those 
values as the upper limit of the transaction price. In 
Japanese public works through field surveys of 
material price, labor price, and depreciation of 
machine and broad survey of quantity-per-unit, the 
ceiling price is derived. The engineer’s estimate 
obtained in the above-mentioned process seems 
more exhaustive than those in foreign countries. In 
deriving this ceiling price, however, all construction 
conditions of each work are not necessarily 
incorporated. Thus, this price is still considered 
average price of the works given conditions. 
The third characteristic is that the both clients set 
the upper limit of the transaction prices and do not 
accept negotiations for price change in principle. In 
the Japanese public works the ceiling price strictly 
becomes the upper limit. If all bid prices exceed the 
ceiling price, contractors are asked to re-bid. In this 
case, the ceiling price is not changed.  
Furthermore, in the current standard covenants of 
public works, there is no article prescribing equal 
rights of the contractor to make claims against the 
client. Some change in contract value should be 
decided through negotiations between the client and  
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Table 1 Similarities between the two approaches 
 Arrangement by  
De Beers Group 
Conventional Public Construction Procurement 
Practices in Japan 
Characteristics of 
client 
-The largest market of 
gem-quality rough diamond in the 
world 
-Monopolistic transaction  
Determination of 
transaction price 
-Sales price as the averaged value
-Determining the price through 
imperfectly categorizing 
characteristics of gem 
-the ceiling price as the standard value 
-Detailed construction conditions are not 
necessarily fully incorporated into estimation of 
the ceiling price  
Change in  
transaction price 
-Price negotiation is not accepted. -The ceiling price has the strict upper-bound. 
-Claim from the contractor is not accepted.  
Discontinuation 
of transaction 
-Change in pre-selected box is not 
accepted. 
-Buyers’ rejection of the sales 
offer leads to the withdrawal by 
De Beers of future invitations to 
purchase stones 
-Contractor’s rejection of designation, “offer” to 
be the winner of the contract, request of providing 
services not specified in the contract leads to the 
withdrawal by the client of future designation     
Level of  
transaction price 
-Premium is put on the averaged 
value of categorized stones 
-Prices of public works seem higher than that of 
similar private construction.  
-Generally high return associated with design 
document change 
Determination of  
transaction  
partner 
-Buyers are selected by the De 
Beer Group 
-Bidders are designated by the client. 
 
the contractor in principle. However, it has been 
pointed out for a long time that “contract issues are 
often left up to the client and the contractor is apt to 
be in a weaker position.” The public clients often 
determine the change in contract value by 
themselves. 
There are the following merits associated with the 
ceiling price with the strict upper-bound and the 
public client’s discretional way of changing the 
contract value. First, the above-mentioned nature 
makes the client easy in controlling the budget by 
clearly setting the upper limit of transaction price. 
Second, this nature has avoided “oversearching” for 
the both client and contractor, that is, the behavior to 
search the accurate transaction price with the 
excessive precision. 
The fourth similarity is that the client does not 
substantially accept an offer from the partner to 
withdraw from this transaction even though the 
client determines the transaction price in a one-sided 
manner. Under the conventional practices, the 
designated contractor cannot refuse the participation 
in the bid. Moreover the contractor who is agreed to 
win the contract among designated contractors must 
win the contract no matter how low the ceiling price 
is set for that particular project. If all bid prices are 
lower than the ceiling price, the public client would 
lose his/her face. Furthermore, in practice, some 
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public client requests the contractor to do various 
types of service which are not specified in the 
contract. The contractor cannot refuse to do these 
jobs either. 
If the business offer is rejected by the partner, the 
client has to seek the second partner. If the second 
partner rejects the offer, the client has to seek the 
third one. If the rejection is allowed, thus, smooth 
business transaction would be possibly hindered with 
a series of rejections. Not accepting the business 
offer of rejection becomes a key for the client to ease 
time control in business transactions.       
The fifth concern is that the averaged price of the 
actual transaction price seems to be set higher than 
the estimated market price. Comparing the prices of 
public and private building construction in which 
their direct comparison is possible, the price of 
public works is considered higher than that of similar 
private building. Under recession, especially, 
difference in price between the public and private 
buildings becomes even larger. 
Regarding the design document change, not a few 
indeterminate factors exist, which is often criticized 
by contractors. Nonetheless, it has been often 
pointed out by the client that the design document 
change is actually high return business for the 
contractor. 
Here by adopting the concept by Kenny and Klein, 
we define the premium as the difference in the 
awarded price of public works and its real market 
price. There may be some projects whose execution 
would only bring deficit; however, the averaged 
premium among projects executed by one contractor 
is generally considered a high value. A high positive 
premium has played an important role in realizing 
smooth and secured implementation of public works. 
The sixth similarity is that the client only does 
business with selected partners. Under the 
designated competitive bidding, the designated 
bidders can only bid. In dango, which is a type of 
rotational and complementary bidding, initiated or 
led by the public client, the client determines the 
“winner” contractor for a project called for a bid. 
Selecting partners has played an important role in 
achieving the certainty of results. 
Kenny and Klein show that “the CSO can 
decrease the probability that stones will be rejected 
can be decreased by i) increasing expenditure on 
presale classification,” thereby decreasing the 
variance in variance of stones in the sight; “ii) by 
increasing the share of the marketing cost savings, 
the premium per stone”; “or iii) by increasing the 
number of stones offered to each buyer per period.” 
By the designation in which continuous 
transactions are done with a limited number of 
contractors, the volume of transaction increases 
between the client and each contractor. Thus, the 
designation corresponds to iii) in the 
above-mentioned measures. 
Implementation of each measure needs different 
types and levels of costs. Implementation of the first 
measure needs higher searching costs of true value. 
The second measure literally increases the premium. 
However, the third measure does not need to 
increase either the search cost or premium.  
The results of this analysis are also applicable to 
designation practice of the Japanese public works. 
First, the designation corresponds to the third 
measure, that is, to increase in the amount of 
transactions. Designation with long-term business 
relationship means that each designated contractor 
generally has more works to do for the public client 
who designates. Second, the designation prevents 
contractors from rejecting offers without increasing 
the search costs or premium.           
In the two types of transactions with the six 
similarities, the expectation bared by the client 
towards contractors is considered the assurance 
defined by Yamagishi. The both clients are very 
much concerned with smooth completion of many 
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transactions. There is a possibility, therefore, that the 
social uncertainty becomes high for the client.  
In order to deal with this situation, the client 
selects certain business partners, has a long term 
business relationship with them, and adds premium 
to the market price and makes the transaction price 
higher. Through these measures, the client creates 
the assurance, that is, to remove the social 
uncertainty by developing a framework that selected 
partners gains much profit as long as they stay in the 
business relationship.       
In the next section, the above-mentioned 
characteristics of the conventional public 
construction procurement in Japan are explained 
through transaction economics approach, and their 
economic viability is comprehensively discussed.    
 
4. ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF JAPANERSE 
PROUCUREMENT PRACTICES 
 
4.1 Transaction Costs in Construction 
Transaction costs are defined as costs which should 
be shouldered by those who participate in transaction 
of goods or service. 
Grunberg and Eve classify transaction costs for 
those who procure construction service as follows:  
i) Search costs are the costs of finding out 
information about who is offering what products or 
services and at what prices. 
ii) Product or service specification costs arise 
because a market supplier will only provide what 
they have contracted to supply. The product or 
service to be supplied therefore has to be specified 
very carefully and fully in order to obtain the desired 
quantity and quality. 
iii) Contract selection, contract design, and 
negotiation costs are the costs of finding or creating 
forms and conditions of contract that are suitable to 
the particular needs of the buyer in the particular 
transaction in question.  
iv) Supplier selection costs occur if the product or 
service to be purchased does not have a single, 
uniform market price, as is the case in construction. 
Normally a price competition will have to be 
organized between potential suppliers, with the 
contract awarded to the lowest priced tenderer. 
v) Contract performance monitoring costs are 
transaction costs incurred due to the need to 
measure and control performance in terms of its 
price, timing and quality. In construction it is not 
sufficient to measure a supplier’s performance once 
only, on completion of the contract. This is because 
the costs of remedying poor quality become 
exorbitant, whilst quality itself becomes very hard to 
measure, once the work in question has been 
incorporated into a finished building. Time 
performance obviously must always be continually 
monitored rather than just measured after the event 
if there is to be scope for corrective measures. 
vi) Contract enforcement costs are the cost of legal 
bills and delays. 
Comprehensive costs associated with construction 
service are the addition of costs needed for 
construction and transaction costs mentioned above. 
Hereafter this addition is referred as comprehensive 
construction costs. The comprehensive costs consist 
of the following components: 
i) construction production costs (pure production and 
finance costs); 
ii) advance transaction costs (search, product or 
service specification, contract selection, contract 
design, and negotiation, and supplier selection 
costs); 
iii) interim transaction costs (contract performance 
monitoring costs); and 
iv) posteriori transaction costs (contract enforcement 
costs) 
Efficiency of procurement of construction service 
is not solely represented with construction 
production costs. For example, the British market 
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which has attempted to minimize the production 
costs through market is criticized against its 
inefficiency. Overall efficiency of procurement is 
partly represented with the comprehensive 
construction costs. A goal of designing procurement 
systems of public works is to find and implement 
advance and interim transaction processes such that 
the comprehensive construction costs are minimized.        
 
4.2 Level of transaction costs associated with 
conventional schemes  
Level of transaction costs associated with 
conventional schemes is discussed as follows. 
Search costs are considered low. The first factor is 
nature of competition as pointed out by Kunishima. 
That is, the conventional competitive bidding in 
Japan has been “controlled competition among 
contractors with the same business type and rank in 
the same region.” The second factor is an efficient 
way of ranking contractors based on scores of the 
business evaluation.  
Product or service specification costs are also 
considered low. Characteristics to lower these costs 
are as follows: 
i) in not a few projects, scope of works are 
undetermined, and precision of design drawing is 
low; 
ii) the ceiling price is efficiently estimated through 
obtain the statistically averaged price of each project 
based on the records of past projects; and 
iii) in many types of works, standard rate of 
productivity is specified, and cost estimation manual 
is published. These enable public client to do cost 
estimation easily.  
Regarding contract selection, contract design, and 
negotiation costs, one component pushes up them, 
but the other components lower them. The former 
component is slicing and packaging contracts, which 
has been employed to achieve equal sharing among 
contractors. The latter components are no room for 
price negotiation, which avoids oversearching, and 
existence of assurance, which removes the social 
uncertainty and minimizes the role of contracts.   
Supplier selection costs are also low because the 
winner is basically determined through the dango 
among contractors or the dango initiated and led by 
public client.  
It is not straightforward to estimate contract 
performance monitoring costs because role sharing 
of site management and monitoring are often unclear 
among related parties. It is reported, however, that 
“under the term of “responsible construction,” which 
is often used by construction parties but not specified 
in the contract, the client often requests contractors 
to do works out of project scope.” This report hints 
that the contract performance monitoring costs are 
also low. 
It should be noted, however, that in many 
Japanese public works payment from the client to 
contractors is generally made at the beginning and 
completion of projects. Thus, many monitoring 
works and their related costs concentrate at the end 
of project.     
Contract enforcement costs are low because there 
has been hardly dispute between the client and the 
contractor in Japanese public works. 
Thus, advance, interim, and posteriori transaction 
costs associated with conventional public 
construction procurement practices are considered 
low. 
 
5. STRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
ASSURANCE SYSTEMS 
 
Figure 1 represents a basic structure of bidding and 
contracting schemes, which have been formed after 
high economic growth period since the end of 1950's. 
The author calls this scheme the assurance systems. 
The systems consist of designation and dango 
bidding and unilateral but high return contract. 
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Two types of brand name in transaction by De 
Beer Group, which Kenny and Klein pointed out, 
also exist in the assurance systems.   
The advance, interim, and posteriori transaction 
costs are reduced by creating the assurance. Efficient 
execution of projects at low transaction costs 
corresponds to the first type of brand. Furthermore, it 
is possible to understand that these low transaction 
costs are returned to contractors through high return 
contract. This return to contractors corresponds to 
the second brand. 
There is a danger that nature of unilateral contract 
lowers client’s trustworthiness. However, the second 
brand has been playing a crucial role in maintaining 
the trustworthiness of the client. 
The ceiling price in the assurance systems has 
brought two benefits. First, its upper-bound eases 
client’s management of budget and time because no 
price negotiation is allowed. A combination of high 
ceiling price and designation prevents incompletion 
of contract and promotes smooth construction. Thus, 
the high ceiling price eases time and quality 
management for the client.   
The assurance systems can exist because low 
taxpayers’ consciousness for Japanese and sufficient 
budget. 
Similarly to arrangement employed by De Beers 
Group, the assurance systems had achieved efficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Structure of Assurance Systems 
transactions and avoided occurrence of the social 
uncertainty. The systems are effective and efficient 
when there is sufficient budget and massive 
construction is required.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Gruneberg，S.L. and Ive，G.J., 2000. The Economics 
of the Modern Construction Firm, Macmillan Press 
Ltd. (Book) 
 
Kenney，R.W. and Klein，B., 1983. The Economics 
of Block Booking，Journal of Law and Economics，
Vol.XXVI，pp.497-540. (Journal Articles). 
 
Kunishima, M. and Shoji, M., 1994. The Principles 
of Construction Management, Sankaido, Tokyo. 
(Book) 
 
Yamagishi, T., 1998. Shinrai no Kozo (Structure of 
trust), in Japanese, Tokyo University Press. (Book) 
 
Watanabe, T., Framework for Public Procurement 
Systems Reform Under “Glocalization, ” 
Proceedings of International Symposium on 
Globalization and Construction 2004，CIB，Bangkok，
THAILAND，pp.111-121，2004. (Proceedings) 
